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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR BAD ACTS IN
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES UNDER ALASKA
RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(b) - AN EMERGING
DOUBLE STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence of prior bad acts, when intended by the prosecution to
establish a general disposition or propensity for criminal activity, is
ordinarily inadmissible under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b).1 The
underlying rationale for the exclusion of such evidence is that prior
bad acts are considered irrelevant in proving present conduct because
any probative value is outweighed by the possibility of prejudice and
confusion. 2 Rule 404(b) continues the general rule developed at com-
mon law excluding the circumstantial use of character evidence. 3
Character is used circumstantially when it is suggested that a person is
likely to act consistently with an established character or certain char-
acter traits. Under the "propensity rule," therefore, evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character in order to
suggest that conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with
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1. Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b). The Alaska rule is substantially similar to Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), which states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
2. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 557 (3d ed. 1984); 22 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5239, at 436 (1978).
3. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note; ALASKA R. EVID.
404(b) commentary; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5239, at 439. Cir-
cumstantial character evidence is also referred to as "extrinsic offense evidence." See
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190, at 557 n.7.
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such character.4 In Soper v. State, 5 however, the Alaska Court of Ap-
peals ruled that, under certain limited circumstances, evidence show-
ing a general pattern or history of sexual abuse by the defendant was
admissible to prove culpability for a particular sexual assault.6 Thus,
the Soper decision reverses the previously enunciated position of the
court of appeals with respect to the admission of prior bad acts in sex
crimes cases.7
In Soper, the court of appeals affirmed a jury conviction of sexual
assault in the first degree by the defendant, John P. Soper, on his
youngest daughter, M.S. The conviction resulted from charges that
Soper had sexual intercourse with M.S., a minor child, virtually every
weekend between December 1979 and September 1980, at the family's
lakeside cabin.8 As part of its case-in-chief, the prosecution intended
to introduce evidence establishing that Soper had sexually abused four
of his older daughters regularly from 1963 until 1979.9 Although So-
per was not charged with any of these prior sexual assaults, two of
these daughters were allowed to testify with respect to these earlier
occurrences. Soper argued that the trial court erred in admitting any
evidence of uncharged illegal sexual involvement with his other
daughters.10
Finding no abuse of discretion, 1 the court of appeals upheld the
lower court's evidentiary ruling. In an expansive opinion, the court
concluded that evidence of prior sexual assaults upon other similarly
situated victims falls within the scope of the judicially-recognized
"lewd disposition" exception to exclusionary Rule 404(b).' 2 The court
further held that the probative relevance of the admitted evidence suf-
ficiently outweighed its prejudicial impact under the associated balanc-
ing test of Rule 403.13
4. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190, at 558.
5. 731 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), petition for hearing denied, No. S-2019
(Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
6. Id. at 590-91.
7. See, e.g., Bolden v. State, 720 P.2d 957 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Pletnikoff v.
State, 719 P.2d 1039 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1985) (all three cases holding that sexual conduct with someone other than the
victim is inadmissible under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was being used
for propensity).
8. Soper, 731 P.2d at 588.
9. Id. at 589.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 591.
12. Id. at 590. See Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1248-49 (Alaska 1980) (explain-
ing the "lewd disposition" exception).
13. Soper, 731 P.2d at 591. Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 provides as follows:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
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The Soper decision extends the "lewd disposition" exception,
which was first enunciated by the Alaska Supreme Court in Burke v.
State. 14 As originally formulated, the exception pertained only to evi-
dence of prior sexual acts involving the accused and the same victim. 15
Indeed, the exception is sometimes referred to as the "same victim"
exception. 16 Following Soper, however, the exception now applies to
any evidence of earlier sexual misconduct occurring under "substan-
tially similar circumstances" and with parties having "highly relevant
common characteristics."' 17 Such unique circumstances and charac-
teristics were found by the Soper court to exist among sexually abused
siblings, particularly dependent daughters.18
In addition to broadening the "lewd disposition" exception to
Rule 404(b), the Soper decision also blurs the distinction between evi-
dence of character, which is inadmissible under Rule 404 to show con-
formity of conduct on a particular occasion, 19 and evidence of habit,
which is admissible under Rule 406 to prove such conformity. 20 In
describing what appears to be a new evidentiary standard, the Soper
opinion states that "the common experiences of each of these young
women [siblings in sexual assault cases] establishes a striking pattern
of behavior that seems to occupy the middle ground between evidence
of character, [Alaska Rule of Evidence] 404(b), and habit, [Alaska
Rule of Evidence] 406."21
In recent years, the Alaska Court of Appeals has been faced with
an increasing number of sexual assault and child molestation cases.22
evidence." ALASKA R. EVID. 403. The Alaska standard is somewhat different from
the federal standard, which requires that the probative value of the evidence "substan-
tially" outweigh the prejudice. FED. R. EVID. 403.
14. 624 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1980).
15. Id. at 1248-49; see also 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 402(2)(a) (Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1979).
16. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 727 P.2d 1062, 1063 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
17. Soper, 731 P.2d at 590.
18. Id. at 591.
19. Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows: "Evi-
dence of a person's character or trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose
of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion ......
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a).
20. Alaska Rule of Evidence 406 reads as follows: "Evidence of the habit of a
person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and
regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the
person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or
routine practice." ALASKA R. EVID. 406. The Alaska version is identical to Federal
Rule of Evidence 406.
21. Soper v. State, 731 P.2d 587, 590 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), petition for hearing
denied, No. S-2019 (Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
22. See Note, Nitz v. State: Skewing the Evidentiary Rules to Prosecute Child
Molesters, 4 ALASKA L. REV. 333, 336 (1987) ("Alaska has a higher rate of child
19881
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In its apparent haste to confront this highly visible and disturbing
problem, the court increasingly seems inclined to sidestep well estab-
lished and widely followed evidentiary rules.23 In Soper, the court's
decision represents an emerging double standard in determining the
admissibility of prior bad acts in sexual abuse cases, especially those
involving children. Rather than meaningfully balancing relevancy
against prejudice under Rule 403, the Soper court appeared to be more
influenced by the long and continuous pattern of the sexual assaults,
by the tremendous control of parents over a child, by the reluctance of
victims to testify, and by the evidentiary difficulties in proving sexual
abuse.24
This note argues that the courts should strive to apply existing
evidentiary rules more uniformly, despite the unusually difficult hur-
dles that prosecutors face in sexual abuse and child molestation cases.
Otherwise, the rules may lose their intended effectiveness in other situ-
ations. The decision in Soper reintroduces the concept of propensity
into the framework of Rule 404(b). Soper also represents the failure of
the courts fully to consider the harmful effects inherent in evidence of
prior bad acts.
Section II of this note summarizes the common law development
of prior bad acts in order to provide an historical context for the Soper
decision; it then introduces the concept of prior bad acts under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Section III canvasses the doctrine as it has
evolved under the Alaska Rules of Evidence. Section IV addresses the
application of the prior bad acts doctrine in sexual assault cases before
Soper. Section V considers the position taken by the Alaska Court of
Appeals in Soper that an accused's prior bad acts with other individu-
als may be admissible to show or demonstrate a "lewd disposition" or
an affinity for sexual molestation toward members of a limited class.
Finally, Section VI concludes with a suggestion that the "lewd disposi-
tion" exception to Rule 404(b) should be severely limited, and that a
thorough rather than a perfunctory balancing should be applied under
Rule 403.
abuse/neglect cases than any other state in the country.") (citing PARENTS UNITED,
INC., HELP FOR SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1986)).
23. Previously, the Alaska Law Review has noted a tendency by the Alaska Court
of Appeals to bend the prompt complaint doctrine and the rule governing prior consis-
tent statements in cases involving the sexual assault of children. See Note, supra note
22, at 335.
24. Soper, 731 P.2d at 590.
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II. COMMON LAW HISTORY OF PRIOR BAD ACTS AND PRIOR
BAD ACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The common law rule excluding evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, and acts is generally considered to have originated in England
with the Treason Act of 1695,25 which stated that an overt act not
alleged in the indictment could not be proved at trial.26 This rule
eventually was recognized as the standard of basic fairness in all crimi-
nal trials, not just trials for treason.27 Originally, the rule was not
recognized as one of general exclusion, and the English courts admit-
ted evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts in certain cases. 28
The English rule was accepted by the early American courts, 29
and it eventually developed into a general rule of exclusion accompa-
nied by numerous debilitating exceptions. These exceptions reflected
those situations in which evidence of prior bad acts was traditionally
admitted by the English courts. The common law rule has been sum-
marized in this fashion:
The doing of another criminal act, not a part of the issue, is... not
admissible as evidence of the doing of the criminal act charged, ex-
cept when offered for the specific purpose of evidencing Design,
Plan, Motive, Identity, Intent, or other relevant fact ... distinct
from Moral Character.30
The rule at common law thus precluded the admission of evidence of
prior bad acts, unless such evidence was intended to establish certain
facts - other than the accused's demonstrably defective character -
relevant to the immediate prosecution.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) essentially codifies and continues
this basic doctrine. The following excerpt represents a more contem-
poraneous statement of the traditional principle:
As a general rule the character of a party to a civil [or criminal]
action is not a proper subject of inquiry, for, while it is recognized
that ground for an inference of some logically probative force as to
whether or not a person did a certain act may be furnished by the
fact that his character is such as might reasonably be expected to
predispose him toward or against such an act, this consideration is
outweighed by the practical objections to opening the door to this
25. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in
Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 717 (1981).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 718-19 (evidence of other crimes may be admitted to show intent, ab-
sence of mistake, knowledge, identity, the continuing nature of a criminal operation,
and to impeach a witness).
29. See, e.g., Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574, 576 (1829).
30. J. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE 81 (3d ed. 1942), cited in C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5239, at 428-29.
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class of evidence. There are, however, exceptions to the general
rule .... 31
This particular restatement of the common law highlights an enduring
concern that the undesirable qualities or effects of the offered evidence
not exceed the evidence's probative value. Under most modern ver-
sions of this rule, the comparable balancing process is now governed
by Rule 403.32
The rationale and history behind this long-standing rule, which
circumscribes the use of other crimes evidence, is best explained by
Professor Wigmore:
It may almost be said that it is because of the indubitable relevancy
of specific bad acts showing the character of the accused that such
evidence is excluded. It is objectionable not because it has no appre-
ciable probative value but because it has too much. The natural and
inevitable tendency of the tribunal - whether judge or jury - is to
give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited
and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge or
to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation, irrespective of
the accused's guilt of the present charge. .... 33
Wigmore concluded that this rule of exclusion was so firmly es-
tablished in the common law that it often prevailed in jurisdictions in
which there was no express adoption of the rule.34 Despite the appar-
ently widespread fidelity to this general rule, the plethora of exceptions
tended to constrain the rule's application. Often, the scope and devel-
opment of the exceptions were of greater practical importance than
the controlling rule itself. At other times, the courts have been unable
to distinguish the rule from the exceptions. 35 Nonetheless, the Federal
Rules of Evidence assimilated this broad exclusionary principle along
with most of its exceptions.
The Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates were approved on January 2, 1975, and became effective
on July 1, 1975.36 Federal Rule 404(b), which was amended in 1987, 37
largely embodies the common law exclusionary doctrine it was in-
tended to supersede. Although the application and interpretation of
31. 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 423 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
32. See supra note 13 (quoting ALASKA R. EvID. 403).
33. IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 58.2 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983) (citations omitted).
34. Id.
35. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5239, at 431.
36. Act of January 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975), 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2215.
37. The largely technical amendment substituted, "[ilt may, however, be admissi-
ble," in place of, "[t]his subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered," at
the beginning of the second sentence. The change was adopted on March 2, 1987, and
became effective on October 1, 1987. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The Alaska version
of Rule 404(b) also was amended to reflect this change. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b).
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Rule 404(b) by the federal courts is beyond the scope of this note, such
developments have been elsewhere documented and discussed. 38 The
Alaska courts apparently have not felt constrained by this burgeoning
body of federal authority in construing the state's own version of Rule
404(b). 39
III. PRIOR BAD ACTS UNDER THE ALASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) was adopted and amended by
Order 364 of the Alaska Supreme Court, and has been effective since
August 1, 1979. 40 In determining the evidentiary admissibility of
prior bad acts under Rule 404(b), the Alaska courts have developed a
two-part test. The party seeking to introduce such evidence must first
show some relevance apart from propensity, thereby satisfying the
"other purposes" clause of Rule 404(b).41 The offering party must
then show that the nonpropensity relevance outweighs the presumed
38. See generally Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs,
or Acts Under Rule 404(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence, in Civil Cases, 64 A.L.R. FED.
648 (1983) (collects and analyzes the federal cases that discuss the admissibility of
evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) in civil cases); Annotation, Admissibility
of Evidence of Character or Reputation of Party in Civil Action for Sexual Assault on
Issues other than Impeachment, 100 A.L.R. 3D 569 (1980) (collects and discusses state
civil cases dealing with admissibility of evidence of character or reputation of victim
or defendant in sexual assault cases not involving impeachment of party as a witness);
Annotation, Admissibility, Under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, of
Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Similar to Offense Charged to Show Prepa-
ration or Plan, 47 A.L.R. FED. 781 (1980) (discusses federal criminal cases on point);
Annotation, Admissibility Under Rule 404(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of Evidence
of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Not Similar to Offense Charged, 41 A.L.R. FED. 497
(1979) (discusses federal criminal cases on point); Annotation, Admissibility, in Prose-
cution for Sexual Offense, of Evidence of Other Similar Offenses, 77 A.L.R. 2D 841
(1961) (compiles state common law criminal cases on point).
39. For example, in Oksoktaruk v. State, 611 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1980), the first
case construing ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b), the Alaska Supreme Court cited some fed-
eral authority and related commentary on the prior acts doctrine as it existed before
the adoption of FED. R. EVID. 404(b), but it cited no cases interpreting the federal
rule. Id. at 524 n.3. Subsequent cases often use the Oksoktaruk decision as a starting
point, and make no references to federal or other extra-territorial precedent interpret-
ing Rule 404(b). See, e.g., Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312, 315 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985), aff'd, 726 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1986).
40. See ALASKA R. EvID. 404(b) commentary.
41. See Oksoktaruk, 611 P.2d at 524.
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highly prejudicial impact of the evidence,42 in order to satisfy the dis-
cretionary language of Rule 404(b) 43 and the implicit balancing con-
siderations of Rule 403.44
Both components of this test were described in Oksoktaruk v.
State,45 the first case in which the Alaska Supreme Court considered
the application and scope of Rule 404(b). Phillip Oksoktaruk was
convicted of burglarizing a photography lab after the state had intro-
duced evidence that the defendant had been convicted, two years pre-
viously, of a fur store burglary.46  In reversing Oksoktaruk's
conviction, the court found that the only possible purpose of the evi-
dence was to show a propensity to steal.47 The court also stated that
even if the burglary conviction were relevant, the nexus between the
two burglaries was not sufficiently close to allow admission of the
evidence. 48
In Oksoktaruk, the court concluded that Rule 404(b), like its
common law counterpart, was a rule of exclusion. 49 Thus, evidence of
prior bad acts would be excluded unless it tended to prove some mate-
rial fact other than propensity. More specifically, the court held that
evidence of prior misconduct could never be used in a state prosecu-
tion to establish guilt by means of criminal propensity.50 Rule
404(b) 5' provides, however, that evidence of prior bad acts may be
used to show motive,5 2 opportunity,53 intent,54 preparation,"5 plan, 56
42. Id.
43. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note; ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)
commentary; SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP.
No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1974), reprinted in, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7071; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190, at 565.
44. See supra note 13 (quoting ALASKA R. EVID. 403).
45. 611 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1980).
46. Id. at 523.
47. Id. at 525.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 524.
50. Id.
51. See supra note I (quoting ALASKA R. EvID. 404(b)).
52. See State v. Grogan, 628 P.2d 570, 572 (Alaska 1981); Gafford v. State, 440
P.2d 405, 407-08 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969); Patterson v. State,
732 P.2d 1102, 1103-04 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). But see Pletnikoff v. State, 719 P.2d
1039, 1043-44 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Oswald v. State, 715 P.2d 276, 279 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1986).
53. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190(7), at 563. But see C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5241, at 484-86.
54. See Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528, 531-32 (Alaska), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
876 (1980); Demmert v. State, 565 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1977).
55. Preparation is often considered similar to plan.
56. See Fields v. State, 629 P.2d 46, 49-51 (Alaska 1981); Oswald v. State, 715
P.2d 276, 279-80 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
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knowledge, 57 identity,58 absence of mistake,59 or absence of accident. 60
These enumerated examples were not intended to be exhaustive, how-
ever, and the Oksoktaruk court described several other situations in
which prior acts would be admissible under the "other purposes"
clause of Rule 404(b). These situations include cases in which the
prior act involved the same victim or complainant, 61 the prior act is
used to impeach the credibility of the defendant as a witness, 62 the
prior act occurred contemporaneously with and set the stage for the
present crime (the inseparable or interwoven crimes exception), 63 and
the prior act was committed in a similar manner and under almost
identical circumstances as the present crime (the modus operandi or
handiwork exception). 64
Once the nonpropensity relevance of the evidence is established,
the court must then weigh its probative value against its prejudicial
effects. 65 The Oksoktaruk court indicated that the appropriate balanc-
ing standard is whether the prior misconduct is so related to the pres-
ent crime in point of time or circumstances as to be significantly useful
in establishing the material fact sought to be proved by evidence of the
57. Rhodes v. State, 717 P.2d 422, 424-25, 428 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
58. See State v. Grogan, 628 P.2d 570, 572 (Alaska 1981); Coleman v. State, 621
P.2d 869, 874-75 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1090 (1981); Garner v. State,
711 P.2d 1191, 1192-93 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Nix v. State, 653 P.2d 1093, 1096,
1098-1100 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
59. See Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528, 531-32, 536 n.3 (Alaska), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 876 (1980).
60. See id.
61. Oksoktaruk v. State, 611 P.2d 521, 525 (Alaska 1980). See also Frink v. State,
597 P.2d 154, 169 (Alaska 1979); Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631, 640 (Alaska 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 910 (1978); Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960, 968 (Alaska 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); Nicholi v. State, 451 P.2d 351, 357 (Alaska 1969); Gaf-
ford v. State, 440 P.2d 405, 408 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969);
Watson v. State, 387 P.2d 289, 293 (Alaska 1963).
62. Oksoktaruk 611 P.2d at 525. See also Buchanan v. State, 599 P.2d 749, 750
(Alaska 1979); Richardson v. State, 579 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Alaska 1978); Lowell v.
State, 574 P.2d 1281, 1283-84 (Alaska 1978); Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1985). See also FED. R. EvID. 404(a) advisory committee's note.
This interpretation of Rule 404(b) is really an extension of Alaska Rules of Evi-
dence 608 and 609. Rule 608 governs the impeachment of a witness by evidence of
character for truthfulness or conduct, while Rule 609 governs the impeachment of a
witness by evidence of a prior criminal conviction.
63. Oksoktaruk, 611 P.2d at 525; see also Kugzruk v. State, 436 P.2d 962, 967
(Alaska 1968); C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5239, at 446 & n.97.
64. Oksoktaruk, 611 P.2d at 525; see also Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 874-75
(Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1090 (1981); Demmert v. State, 565 P.2d 155,
158 (Alaska 1977); Nix v. State, 653 P.2d 1093, 1096-99 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
65. This balancing test is contained in Alaska Rule of Evidence 403, quoted supra
note 13.
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
misconduct. 66 Thus, the court was emphasizing two factors: proxim-
ity in time67 and similarity of circumstances. 6  The two burglaries
considered in Oksoktaruk occurred approximately two years apart,
and were found by the court to be sufficiently distant in time to war-
rant exclusion of the offered evidence. 69 The court found that the
methods employed in the two crimes were also somewhat different. In
the fur store burglary, Oksoktaruk had cut a hole in the roof of the
store, and had lifted the furs out without setting foot on the prem-
ises. 70 In the photography lab incident, nothing had been stolen from
or disturbed in the store, and Oksoktaruk claimed that he broke and
entered through a boarded-up window only to escape the cold early
morning air.71
In a similar case, Beekman v. State,72 the Alaska Court of Ap-
peals reversed the defendant's conviction of burglary in the first de-
gree.73 Quinton Beekman successfully argued that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence that he had committed three previous bur-
glaries as a juvenile. In applying the Oksoktaruk test of remoteness
and resemblance, the court of appeals was persuaded by the fact that
the prior burglaries occurred four years earlier, when Beekman was
only fourteen years old, and that the circumstances surrounding the
burglaries were sufficiently diverse. 74
There are a number of other basic factors, however, which are
traditionally considered in the course of a thorough balancing under
Rule 404(b). 75 These factors include the strength of the evidence, 76
the necessity for the evidence, 77 whether the fact sought to be proved
is actually disputed, 78 whether the fact sought to be proved is of real
66. Oksoktaruk v. State, 611 P.2d 521, 525 (Alaska 1980).
67. See also Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528, 532 (Alaska), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
876 (1980); Freeman v. State, 486 P.2d 967, 977 (Alaska 1971); Garner v. State, 711
P.2d 1191, 1193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Beekman v. State, 706 P.2d 704, 706 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1985); Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312, 319 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985),
aff'd, 726 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1986).
68. See also Adkinson, 611 P.2d at 532.
69. Oksoktaruk, 611 P.2d at 523-25.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 706 P.2d 704 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
73. Id. at 706.
74. Id.
75. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190, at 565 & n.57 (summariz-
ing some of these balancing factors).
76. See Patterson v. State, 732 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Johnson
v. State, 727 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d
312, 318-19 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 726 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1986).
77. See Lerchenstein, 697 P.2d at 317.
78. See Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498, 506 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). See also C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190 n.49 and accompanying text, at 564.
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consequence to an ultimate issue in the litigation,79 whether the fact
may be established by other non-prejudicial or less prejudicial evi-
dence,8 0 the likelihood that present culpability will be inferred improp-
erly from the prior act alone,8' whether the evidence arises in the
course of a criminal or civil trial,82 whether in the case of a criminal
trial there is a jury or a non-jury trial, 3 and the effectiveness of a Rule
105 limiting instruction. 4 The courts generally make only passing ref-
erence to the balancing requirement, and do not consistently apply all
of these individual factors to the particular facts of a case.8 5 At times,
79. If not, the evidence generally is not admissible, because it fails to satisfy the
"other purposes" exception to exclusionary Rule 404(b).
80. See Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312, 318 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff'd,
726 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1986); FED. R. EvID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
81. See Oksoktaruk v. State, 611 P.2d 521, 525 (Alaska 1980); Beekman v. State,
706 P.2d 704, 705 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Braaten v. State, 705 P.2d 1311, 1317
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312, 318 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985), aff'd, 726 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1986).
82. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 189-90, at 554, 557.
83. Theoretically, a trial court can be more permissive in admitting potentially
prejudicial evidence when it is sitting without a jury because there is less of a danger
that the judge will confuse the issues, give undue weight to the evidence, or misapply
the standard of guilt. In practice, however, judges are sometimes also swayed by the
preponderance and character of prior acts evidence, as is apparently manifested in the
instant case.
84. See Garner v. State, 711 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Beekman v.
State, 706 P.2d 704, 705 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312,
318 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 726 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1986); see also C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 2, § 59, at 152 n.5.
Alaska Rule of Evidence 105 provides, in relevant part, as follows: "When evi-
dence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to
another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall re-
strict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." ALASKA R.
EVID. 105.
85. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 732 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987)
(court considers only the strength of the evidence); Johnson v. State, 727 P.2d 1062,
1064 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (court considers only the strength of the evidence);
Bolden v. State, 720 P.2d 957, 960-61 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (court references but
does not reach the balancing considerations); Garner v. State, 711 P.2d 1191, 1193
(Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (court satisfied that the trial judge issued a Rule 105 limiting
instruction and deferred to his discretion); Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498, 506 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1985) (court considers only the necessity for the evidence and whether it
supports a disputed fact); Braaten v. State, 705 P.2d 1311, 1317 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985) (court considers only the likelihood that an improper inference will be drawn
from the evidence). But see Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312, 318-19 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1985), aff'd, 726 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1986) (court considers several balancing fac-
tors, including strength, remoteness, resemblance, use of a limiting instruction, likeli-
hood of an improper inference of guilt being made, and sufficiency of other evidence
used for the same purpose).
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courts will weigh the probative value of the evidence against the preju-
dice stemming from its purported legitimate use, while failing to con-
sider all of the potential drawbacks arising from its use.86
A frequently quoted statement8 7 of the basic two-part analysis
under Rule 404(b) is contained in Lerchenstein v. State,88 a recent
court of appeals decision. In Lerchenstein, the defendant was con-
victed by a jury of three counts of assault in the third degree and one
count of murder in the first degree. 89 Adolf Lerchenstein had been
charged with shooting and fatally wounding an automotive garage em-
ployee who was attempting to prevent the defendant from removing
his truck from the business premises before the defendant had paid his
thirty-five dollar bill.90 In reversing the defendant's convictions, the
court held that the evidence of certain prior bad acts,91 which was
admitted during the trial, was more prejudicial than probative.92 In its
decision, the court summarized the adjudicative steps now required
under Rule 404(b):
The trial court's inquiry, then, is two-fold. First, the court must
determine that the evidence sought to be admitted has relevance
apart from propensity. Second, the court must determine that the
nonpropensity relevance outweighs the presumed highly prejudicial
impact of the evidence. If there is no genuine nonpropensity rele-
vance, the balancing step is never reached.93
Citing Oksoktaruk, the court feared that unless this two-part analysis
was followed, "it is all too likely that a determinative inference of pres-
ent guilt will be drawn from the fact of the prior act, thus diluting the
requirement that present guilt be proved beyond a reasonable
86. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5239, at 436.
87. Several cases have relied upon the Lerchenstein formulation of the Rule
404(b) balancing test. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 732 P.2d 1102, 1103 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1987); Johnson v. State, 727 P.2d 1062, 1063 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Bolden v.
State, 720 P.2d 957, 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Garner v. State, 711 P.2d 1191,
1192-93 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498, 504-05 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1985); Braaten v. State, 705 P.2d 1311, 1317 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
88. 697 P.2d 312 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 726 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1986).
89. Id. at 313.
90. Id. at 313-14.
91. The prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence that on the day prior to
the shooting, Lerchenstein had broken into the apartment of one of his former em-
ployees and had damaged certain consumer electronic goods which Lerchenstein had
apparently sold on credit from his retail business' inventory to the ex-employee. The
state also provided evidence of the defendant's verbal threats to kill this former em-
ployee with a gun, threats that Lerchenstein had communicated in a telephone conver-
sation with the employee's landlord on the day of the break-in. See id. at 314.
92. Id. at 318-19.
93. Id. at 315-16 (citations omitted).
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doubt." 94  The Oksoktaruk-Lerchenstein analytical framework re-
mains largely unchanged when applied to sexual assault cases. How-
ever, special doctrines and exceptions have transformed qualitatively
the application of the two-part test in these types of cases.
IV. PRIOR BAD ACTS IN SEXUAL ABUSE CASES IN ALASKA
BEFORE SOPER V. STATE
In Burke v. State,9 5 the Alaska Supreme Court was presented
with a case of first impression regarding-the admissibility of evidence
of prior sexual misconduct under Rule 404(b). Luther J. Burke, the
defendant, appealed his conviction for statutory rape of his fifteen-
year-old stepdaughter, arguing that evidence of prior sexual miscon-
duct with the same victim was inadmissible under Rule 404(b).96 The
prosecution had provided evidence that Burke had had sexual inter-
course with his stepdaughter on four or five occasions since the victim
was nine years old. 97 In affirming Burke's conviction, the court
adopted the so-called "lewd disposition" or "same victim" exception
to Rule 404(b). 98 Under this exception, evidence of prior sexual as-
saults against the same victim is admissible in evidence as being highly
probative of the defendant's lewd or lustful disposition toward the
victim.99
There are several rationales supporting the "lewd disposition" ex-
ception. First, proponents assert that the prior sexual misconduct is
not offered into evidence to show a general propensity for crime, but
only to demonstrate a propensity toward criminal activity with the
same person. 100 Second, they argue that the existence of similar
crimes is probative of an ongoing relationship between the accused
and the victim, which makes repetition of the crime particularly
likely. 101 Finally, evidence of a lewd disposition is justified as provid-
ing necessary background information to explain and give credence to
94. Id. at 318 (citing Oksoktaruk v. State, 611 P.2d 521, 524 (Alaska 1980)).
95. 624 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1980).
96. Id. at 1247.
97. Id. at 1246-47.
98. Id. at 1248. Many jurisdictions recognize the "lewd disposition" exception
for prior sexual acts with the same victim. See, e.g., People v. Kelley, 66 Cal. 2d 232,
240, 424 P.2d 947, 955, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363, 371 (1967); People v. Greeley, 14 Ill. 2d
428, 431-32, 152 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1958); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 627, 382 A.2d
526, 533 (1978).
99. Burke, 624 P.2d at 1248-49. See also J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 402(2)(b)
(such evidence may be used to show a desire for the victim, plan, design, or intent).
100. Burke, 624 P.2d at 1248.
101. Id. at 1249.
1988]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
the victim's testimony.10 2 In brief, evidence of prior sexual miscon-
duct is considered to be admissible under the "lewd disposition" ex-
ception because the propensity which is inferred is well focused, the
propensity stems from an ongoing relationship, and the propensity
provides "harmless" contextual clarification.
The nonpropensity necessity for the "lewd disposition" exception
is not apparent, and has never been clarified by the courts. Indeed, the
exception is often used instead of, or in conjunction with, an attempt
to show motive, plan, design, intent, identity, or handiwork. Not only
do these exceptions overlap, but frequently they become functionally
interchangeable. Most unusual is the fact that the "lewd disposition"
exception is limited only to sexual abuse cases; there is no correspond-
ing "violent disposition," "destructive disposition," "treacherous dis-
position," or similar exception. The only credible explanation is that
all of these exceptions, including the "lewd disposition" exception,
constitute cloaks for the introduction of propensity evidence. The
Alaska courts are not alone in attempting to weaken Rule 404(b) in
sex crime cases, and several commentators believe that the propensity
rule has collapsed in this area.10 3
While potentially very broad in scope, the "lewd disposition" ex-
ception, like the other prior acts exceptions, is not completely without
limits. There are subsequent, though isolated, court decisions in
Alaska which indicate that certain sexual misconduct between the de-
fendant and the same victim may not be admissible. Sometimes Rule
403 balancing considerations do operate to exclude otherwise relevant
evidence. In Johnson v. State, lo4for example, the court of appeals held
that evidence of a single prior uncharged incident of sexual abuse
which allegedly occurred eighteen months previously was not suffi-
cient to establish an ongoing relationship between the accused and the
victim, and therefore was not admissible.10 5 Allan Johnson, the de-
fendant, was convicted of felonious sexual assault in the second degree
for fondling and molesting a six-year-old girl.' 0 6 The court reversed
Johnson's conviction upon determining that the Burke exception did
not apply to a solitary event somewhat remote in time.10 7
102. Id.
103. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 230
(2d ed. 1982). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190(4), at 560-61 ("proof of
other sex crimes always was confined to offenses involving the same parties, but a
number of jurisdictions now admit other sex offenses with other persons, at least as to
offenses involving sexual aberrations." (citations omitted)).
104. 727 P.2d 1062 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
105. Id. at 1064.
106. Id. at 1062.
107. Id. at 1064.
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In Burke v. State, ' 08 the Alaska Supreme Court expressly de-
clined to resolve the more difficult issue of whether evidence of prior
sexual misconduct with other victims should be allowed under Rule
404(b). 10 9 To date, the supreme court has not ruled directly on this
question.110 In a pre-Rule 404(b) case, however, the court did decide
that evidence of prior physical child abuse by the defendant against a
child who was not the victim in the immediate case was inadmissible
unless identity was at issue. In this case, Harvey v. State, 1 the court
reasoned that evidence of past abusive conduct in child abuse cases is
often relevant only to show a propensity of the past offender to con-
tinue a pattern of child abuse, and that past incidents of child abuse
are generally held to be more prejudicial than probative. 112 Although
the two situations are not identical, there appear to be no significant
doctrinal differences between physical and sexual child abuse.
In contrast to the absence of supreme court decisions in the sex-
ual assault area, the Alaska Court of Appeals has had several opportu-
nities to consider the problem left unanswered in Burke. As recently
as 1985 and 1986, the court of appeals refused to extend the "lewd
disposition" exception to include evidence of sexual misconduct with
persons other than the victim. In Moor v. State, 113 the court of appeals
concluded that evidence of the defendant's sexual conduct with some-
one other than the victim was conceptually indistinguishable from evi-
dence of propensity.114 James Moor II, the defendant in this case, was
charged with digitally penetrating a thirteen-year-old girl in a dark-
ened movie house.115 He was subsequently convicted by a jury of felo-
nious sexual abuse. 116 The victim was a classmate and friend of the
defendant's niece. 117
Although the court ultimately affirmed Moor's felony conviction,
it rejected the state's contention that incidents of sexual abuse are al-
ways admissible in sexual abuse cases to show a "lewd disposition."'"18
108. 624 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1980).
109. Id. at 1249.
110. In Burke, the Alaska Supreme Court quoted authority indicating that the
number of jurisdictions allowing evidence of sexual misconduct with persons other
than the victim were a distinct minority. Id. at 1249 n.14 (citing R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 221 (1977)); see also R. LEMPERT
& S. SALTZBURG, supra note 103, at 229.
111. 604 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1979).
112. Id. at 590.
113. 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
114. Id. at 506.
115. Id. at 500.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 501.
118. Id. at 506.
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The court specifically held that evidence indicating that Moor had sex-
ually abused his niece was not admissible for non-impeachment pur-
poses.'19 While declining to expand the "lewd disposition" exception,
the court acknowledged that evidence of third-party sexual miscon-
duct could be admissible if it fell within one of the other exceptions to
Rule 404(b), and if it did not constitute disguised propensity evi-
dence. 120 The court indicated, however, that in cases of sexual abuse
the trial court must carefully scrutinize evidence of uncharged sexual
misconduct. 121
In Bolden v. State 122 and Pletnikoff v. State, 123 the court of ap-
peals reaffirmed its decision in Moor, which was decided less than a
year earlier. Robert Bolden was convicted of rape, and of lewd and
lascivious acts toward children. 124 The named victims were his two
adolescent daughters. Over Bolden's objections, the prosecution intro-
duced evidence that, for a period of three years, the defendant had
sexually abused his two daughters and a number of their friends, all of
them minors. 125 In particular, the state alleged that Bolden either per-
suaded or coerced his daughters and some of their friends, by bribery
and intoxication, to touch and stimulate his penis, to perform fellatio
upon him, to allow him to fondle their breasts and vaginal area, to
permit him to perform cunnilingus on them, and to have sexual inter-
course with him.126 In reversing Bolden's convictions, the court found
that the trial court had erred in admitting evidence of numerous sex-
ual acts that the defendant allegedly committed with victims other
than those named in the present indictment. 127 Citing Moor, the court
held that the evidence was irrelevant to any material fact besides pro-
pensity, and that its admission constituted reversible error. 28
In Pletnikoff, Patrick Pletnikoff was convicted by a jury of feloni-
ous sexual assault in the first degree of an adult female acquain-
tance. 129 As part of its prima facie case, the prosecution introduced
testimonial evidence that the defendant also had raped a woman who
was the victim's roommate and co-worker. 130 In reversing Pletnikoff's
119. Id.
120. Id. at 506-07.
121. Id. at 506.
122. 720 P.2d 957 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
123.- 719 P.2d 1039 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
124. Bolden, 720 P.2d at 958.
125. Id. at 958-59.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 960.
128. Id.
129. Pletnikoff v. State, 719 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
130. Id. at 1040-42.
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conviction, the court noted that, under Moor, evidence of a lustful dis-
position is admissible only in those cases in which the defendant's ear-
lier misconduct involved the same victim.1 3 ' The court explained that
even if the two episodes were identical, evidence of the first incident
used to corroborate evidence of the latter is inadmissible, because such
corroboration is simply a showing of propensity under another
guise. 132 In Pletnikoff, the court also repudiated the "smorgasbord"
approach to prior crimes evidence, wherein the offering party indis-
criminately claims that the evidence is being admitted for all of the
reasons listed in Rule 404(b). 13 3 The court warned that while overlap
is often possible, it is unlikely that evidence would ever be admissible
in any given case for all the purposes contained in Rule 404(b).134
Consequently, the trial courts must indicate the precise basis upon
which the evidence of other acts is being admitted. 135
Finally, in Oswald v. State,136 the court of appeals determined
that evidence of a defendant's former sexual activities with third per-
sons was not admissible under the motive exception to Rule 404(b)
because such evidence is indistinguishable from evidence of a generally
lustful character. 137 Although not decided under the "lewd disposi-
tion" exception of Burke, the court's reasoning parallels the "same
victim" rationale contained in the Moor decision and those cases fol-
lowing Moor.
V. THE SOPER DECISION
In Soper v. State, 138 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that, when
proving sexual abuse on a particular occasion, the prosecution may
introduce evidence of prior sexual misconduct if the earlier miscon-
duct occurred under substantially similar circumstances and with par-
ties having highly relevant common characteristics and experiences. 139
131. Id. at 1044.
132. Id. at 1044 n.3.
133. Id. at 1042 n.1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 715 P.2d 276 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
137. Id. at 279.
138. 731 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), petition for hearing denied, No. S-2019
(Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
139. Id. at 590. Alaska is not the first jurisdiction in which the "lewd disposition"
exception has been extended to sexual acts with third parties. See, e.g., State v.
Parker, 106 Ariz. 54, 56, 470 P.2d 461, 463-64 (1970); Lamar v. State, 245 Ind. 104,
109, 195 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1964) (later criticized in Meeks v. State, 249 Ind. 659, 664,
234 N.E.2d 629, 632 (1968)); State v. Schlak, 253 Iowa 113, 116, 111 N.W.2d 289, 291
(1961) (later limited in State v. Maestas, 224 N.W.2d 248, 250-51 (Iowa 1974)); Com-
monwealth v. King, 387 Mass. 464, 471, 441 N.E.2d 248, 252 (1982) (later criticized
in Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 388 Mass. 749, 763, 498 N.E.2d 1106, 1114 (1983)
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Through this decision, the court has vitiated Alaska Rule of Evidence
404(b) by creating an expansive new exception for any lewd disposi-
tion towards members of a limited class. Moreover, the Soper decision
contravenes the court's recent line of decisions prohibiting evidence
with respect to sexual misconduct between the defendant and persons
other than the victim in the immediate case. 14° The unsettling result
of this decision is to permit evidence of criminal propensity to be ad-
mitted in sexual assault and abuse cases, thereby allowing the state to
prove culpability for specific offenses through inferences of a general
character for lustfulness.
John P. Soper was charged with sexually abusing his youngest
daughter, M.S., over the course of several months between December
1979 and September 1980.141 Most of these offenses were alleged to
have occurred at the family's weekend cabin at Big Lake. 142 Soper's
first trial ended in a mistrial resulting from a divided jury.143 Upon
retrial, Soper was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree. 44 He
subsequently was sentenced to fourteen years of incarceration with
four years suspended. 145 On appeal, both the conviction and the sen-
tence were affirmed by the court of appeals. 146 Soper's petition for
hearing was denied by the Alaska Supreme Court. 147
Prior to his first trial, Soper moved for a protective order, pursu-
ant to Alaska Rules of Evidence 403 and 404, seeking to exclude evi-
dence of prior uncharged sexual activities with his four other
daughters - M.W., C.H., N.W., and T.S.148 The state sought to in-
troduce evidence that Soper had had sexual intercourse with them in a
successive pattern from 1963 until 1979.149 The evidence was in-
tended to establish Soper's motive to seduce each of his daughters as
(O'Connor, J., concurring)); State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 181-82 & n.3 (R.I. 1983)
(later limited in State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d 1000, 1004-05 (R.I. 1985)); Elliot v. State,
600 P.2d 1044, 1047-48 (Wyo. 1979).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 113-37.
141. Soper v. State, 731 P.2d 587, 588 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), petition for hearing
denied, No. S-2019 (Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 588-89.
144. Id. at 588.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 592.
147. The court's vote was split 3-2 against granting the petition for hearing. Soper
v. State, No. S-2019, slip op. at 1 (Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
148. Petition for Hearing at 6, Soper v. State (Alaska Apr. 2, 1987) (No. S-2019)
[hereinafter Petition for Hearing].
149. The state hoped to present evidence that Soper had had sexual intercourse
with M.W. between 1963 and 1967, with C.H. between 1967 and 1969, with N.W.
between 1970 and 1971 and again between 1973 and 1975, and with T.S. in 1979.
Soper, of course, was charged with sexually abusing M.S. between 1979 and 1980. At
trial, evidence revealed that Soper has six daughters. Soper, 731 P.2d at 589.
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they approached puberty, and to show a common plan or scheme to
have sexual relations with them. During the trial, the state also ar-
gued that the evidence was properly admissible to show modus oper-
andi and possibly intent.150 The trial court judge ruled that the
evidence sought to be excluded was admissible under either the motive
or the common plan exceptions to exclusionary Rule 404(b), 151 and
that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial im-
pact. 152 In refusing the issuance of the protective order, Judge Buck-
alew was persuaded by the fact that the uncharged acts involved a
limited class of victims living in the same family unit. Nonetheless, he
issued a Rule 105 limiting instruction to the jury,15 3 directing them to
consider the evidence of prior misconduct only for the specific purpose
of showing a characteristic method, plan, scheme, or motive.
Two of Soper's stepdaughters, N.W. and M.W., testified at both
trials. 154 At the second trial, each testified that Soper had sexual inter-
course with them on a number of occasions, that several of these inci-
dents occurred at the home in Big Lake, and that Soper told them that
their willingness to have sexual intercourse with him would demon-
strate their love for him. 155 One of the girls, N.W., testified that So-
per, in order to assuage her fears of pregnancy, had told her that he
had had a vasectomy.' 5 6 Soper reportedly had appeased M.S. with
this same information. The other girl, M.W., described the similarities
of her experiences to those of M.S., the youngest daughter.1
57
Although both M.W. and M.S. had reported their sexual abuse, their
claims were met with disbelief and family rejection.' 5 Eventually,
they both were driven to leave home. Two of Soper's other daughters
- C.H. (a third stepdaughter) and T.S. (one of his natural daughters)
- did not testify at either of the trials. At a grand jury hearing, how-
ever, both girls denied that Soper had ever abused them.' 59 At his
trial, Soper admitted that he had sexual intercourse with N.W. when
she was seventeen years old, but denied ever having sexual contact
with M.W.160
150. Petition for Hearing, supra note 148, at 7.
151. See generally supra note 1, and the discussion of the Rule 404(b) exceptions in
Section III.
152. See supra note 13 (quoting ALASKA R. EVID. 403, which outlines this balanc-
ing test).
153. See supra note 84 (quoting ALASKA R. EVID. 105).
154. Soper v. State, 731 P.2d 587, 589 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), petition for hearing
denied, No. S-2019 (Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Petition for Hearing, supra note 148, at 7 n.4; Soper, 731 P.2d at 589 n.1.
160. Soper, 731 P.2d at 589.
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In appealing his conviction, Soper contended that the trial court
erred in allowing testimony from N.W. and M.W. regarding their sex-
ual contacts with him. More specifically, Soper argued that this evi-
dence was inadmissible to show motive, common scheme or plan,
handiwork, or any other exceptions to Rule 404(b).1 61 On appeal, the
state conceded that the prior bad acts evidence was inadmissible to
establish the defendant's motive, but continued to assert that the evi-
dence was admissible to show an ongoing scheme to obtain sexual
gratification from each of his daughters.162 In his defense, Soper also
argued that M.S. had always been a problem child, that she ran away
from home because she did not get along with other family members,
and that she was fabricating the charges of sexual abuse in order to
obtain a financial interest in the family's recreational property at Big
Lake. 163
From the foregoing facts, the court of appeals was presented with
the question of whether evidence of prior sexual misconduct with per-
sons other than the victim was admissible under Alaska Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b) in proving culpability for the charged offense. In
resolving this issue, the Soper court purported to apply the two-tiered
analysis first developed in Oksoktaruk 164 and later followed in
Lerchenstein.165 In so doing, the court substantially enlarged the
boundaries of the "lewd disposition" exception originally defined by
the Alaska Supreme Court in Burke. 166 The court of appeals also re-
jected its recent determinations in Bolden,167 Pletnikoff,16 8  and
Moor, 16 9 in order to recognize an exception for evidence regarding sex-
ual misconduct with persons other than the named victim. In at-
tempting to distinguish rather than overrule these earlier decisions, the
161. Appellant's Brief at 22-26, Soper v. State, 731 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987) (No. A-583), petition for hearing denied, No. S-2019 (Alaska Apr. 2, 1987);
Appellee's Brief at 1-3, Soper (No. A-583) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief]; Petition for
Hearing, supra note 148, at 7.
162. Appellee's Brief, supra note 161, at 12-16; Petition for Hearing, supra note
148, at 7.
163. Soper, 731 P.2d at 589.
164. Oksoktaruk v. State, 611 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1980). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 45-71.
165. Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 726 P.2d
546 (Alaska 1986). See supra text accompanying notes 87-94.
166. Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1980). See supra text accompanying
notes 95-107.
167. Bolden v. State, 720 P.2d 957 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). See supra text accom-
panying notes 124-28.
168. Pletnikoff v. State, 719 P.2d 1039 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). See supra text
accompanying notes 129-35.
169. Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 113-21.
[Vol. 5:193
PRIOR BAD ACTS
court stressed the high degree of similarity of the daughters' exper-
iences, and the ongoing pattern of sexual abuse by the defendant over
a substantial period of time. 170 Realistically, the Soper decision repu-
diates Moor and its progeny, tramples upon the natural limits of the
"same victim" exception, and introduces an exception that effectively
eclipses the exclusionary presumption of Rule 404(b). Most signifi-
cantly, the decision in Soper permits the introduction of evidence of
criminal propensity and of a character for lustfulness supposedly pro-
hibited under even the most generous reading of Rule 404(b).
In reaching this new position, the court of appeals was apparently
persuaded by the following five factors. First, the prior bad acts took
place under substantially similar circumstances and conditions. 171 In
other words, the girls' ages when abused, the location of the assaults,
and the methods of persuasion were largely identical. Second, all of
the alleged victims were members of a limited class of individuals pos-
sessing highly relevant common characteristics. 172 That is to say, the
victims were all dependent daughters of the same parent. Third, the
purported acts illuminated a pattern of sexual abuse occurring over a
substantial period of time. 173 This third factor is arguably one of pure
propensity, or possibly guilt by repetition.174 Intriguingly, the court
appears to divine a new category for evidence of criminal sexual pro-
pensity that "seems to occupy the middle ground between evidence of
character, [Alaska Rule of Evidence] 404(b), and habit, [Alaska Rule
of Evidence] 406." 175 In actuality, the court blurs the distinction be-
tween evidence of character, which under Rule 404 is generally not
admissible to prove conformity therewith, 176 and evidence of habit,
which is admissible under Rule 406 to prove such conformity. 17 7 The
fourth factor cited by the court was the assumption that a sexually
abusive parent has tremendous control over his or her dependent chil-
dren, and thereby is able to minimize the risk of discovery and cajole
the young victims into silence. 178 Finally, the court was concerned by
170. Soper v. State, 731 P.2d 587, 590 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), petition for hearing
denied, No. S-2019 (Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. In their treatise, Professors Wright and Graham state that "if the jury con-
victs because of the multiplicity of accusations rather than the strength of the evi-
dence, the right to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may be impaired." C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5239, at 438.
175. Soper, 731 P.2d at 590.
176. See supra notes 1, 19 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
178. Soper, 731 P.2d at 590.
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the fact that corroborative evidence of child sexual abuse is very diffi-
cult to obtain. 179 The court believed that these cases normally com-
prise a swearing contest between the child who is reluctantly alleging
sexual abuse and the parent who is denying it. Often, the credibility of
the child is attacked, and no other direct evidence of the assault is
available.
The court also found that the facts in Soper satisfied two of the
three Burke justifications for the original "lewd disposition" excep-
tion.18 0 The court first determined that the evidence tended to unify
the various offenses, thus giving them strong relevance to the charged
offense.181 Apparently, the offenses in aggregate were functionally
equivalent to the "ongoing relationship" emphasized in Burke. ' 8 2 The
court next found that the evidence also provided background informa-
tion helpful in explaining the relationship between the defendant-fa-
ther and his dependent daughter.1 83 Without this information, the
court felt that M.S.'s story would appear unnatural, unbelievable, and,
by probable implication, unconvincing. 8 4 What the court failed to
discuss, however, was the primary rationale of the Burke court. In the
Burke opinion, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with two leading
treatise writers that evidence of prior sexual abuse was admissible
under the "lewd disposition" exception because such evidence was not
intended to show a general propensity to crime, but rather to demon-
strate a lustful attitude or a propensity toward criminal activity with
the same person. 8 5 In contrast, the Soper decision must be inter-
preted as sanctioning the use of third-party evidence to prove a gener-
ally lustful disposition or a propensity for sexual misconduct with all
similarly situated persons within a limited class.
The disturbing use of propensity evidence is manifested in the So-
per opinion's concluding paragraph:
Soper may be a model citizen and, but for his sexual abuse, a good
father. However, given the extended period of abuse of the named
victim, coupled with verified and substantial history of abusing his
daughters, we are satisfied that the trial court was not clearly mis-
taken in imposing a sentence of fourteen years with four years
suspended.' 86
179. Id.
180. Id. at 591; Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1248-50 (Alaska 1980).
181. Soper, 731 P.2d at 591.
182. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
183. Soper, 731 P.2d at 591. See also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
184. Soper, 731 P.2d at 591.
185. Burke, 624 P.2d at 1248 (citing R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note
110, at 220-21).
186. Soper, 731 P.2d at 592.
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Based on the record, however, the defendant's history of sexual abuse
was never adequately verified. Only two of Soper's six daughters testi-
fied at trial. 187 Their allegations were no longer separately actionable
because the statute of limitations for these offenses had expired by
1984, the year of Soper's indictment. 18 8 Three of Soper's daughters,
including the named victim, all denied under oath that Soper had sex-
ually abused them. 189 Thus, the primary evidence of Soper's guilt for
the charged offense was the testimony of two of his six daughters re-
garding prior alleged acts which were themselves not subject to prose-
cution. Furthermore, no evidence sufficient to convict Soper of these
earlier crimes was presented. Objectively, this testimony was not suffi-
cient even to establish the similar circumstances or common charac-
teristics of the group. The Soper decision also raises the related
question of whether these so-called limited classes of individuals are
self-defining or whether they must be defined on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, irrespective of whether the evidence of prior bad acts was
properly admissible under the expanded "lewd disposition" exception
of Rule 404(b), both the trial court and the court of appeals failed to
balance thoroughly the probativity of the offered evidence against its
presumed prejudicial impact under Rule 403.190 Although both tribu-
nals alluded to the required balancing step, neither court felt that it
was necessary or appropriate to reveal its application, if there actually
was one, in Soper's situation. For all of these reasons, the admission
of the prior acts evidence constituted an abomination of the general
rule excluding propensity evidence contained in Rule 404(b).
VI. CONCLUSION
The Soper decision represents an emerging double standard in de-
termining the admissibility of prior bad acts in sexual abuse cases, es-
pecially those involving children. Ordinarily, the state may not use
evidence of earlier misconduct to show conformity of action with pe-
culiar character traits or identifiable criminal tendencies. Rule 404
embodies this general doctrine excluding evidence of one's propensity
to commit misdeeds. Under the exceptions listed in subsection (b) of
Rule 404, however, the state may use otherwise inadmissible character
evidence to show one or several specific elements of the charged of-
fense. Traditionally, the prosecution must expressly stipulate those el-
ements that it intends to prove by means of the character evidence,
and the trial court must base its evidentiary ruling on the relevance of
the offered evidence in establishing those elements. If the court finds
187. Id. at 589.
188. ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.010 (1984).
189. Petition for Hearing, supra note 148, at 12.
190. See supra note 13 (quoting ALASKA R. EvID. 403).
1988]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
that the proffered evidence is relevant, then it must balance the proba-
tive value of the evidence against its presumed highly prejudicial im-
pact under Rule 403. Once again, the prosecution bears the burden of
persuading the court that the probativity outweighs the prejudice. In
addition, the trier of fact is obligated to ascertain present guilt from
the facts directly related to the charged offense; the trier may not infer
culpability from evidence of prior activities which are themselves often
uncharged, unsubstantiated, and not actionable. This entire process is
premised on the assumption that evidence of prior bad acts is poten-
tially relevant in every prosecution, but that such evidence is nearly
always inflammatory or confusing. Another drawback of this evi-
dence is that culpability for the antecedent event is rarely established
by evidence that convinces beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather by
the mere presentment of evidence. 191 Rules 403 and 404 were in-
tended to take these factors into consideration.
In Soper, the court concluded that the state's evidence of prior
bad acts was admissible under a judicially created exception to Rule
404(b). This exception is available only in sexual abuse cases, and pre-
viously, its application was limited to earlier assaults upon the same,
victim. In order to invoke the exception, the Alaska Court of Appeals
rejected its own recent precedents, and broadened the exception to in-
clude all earlier assaults upon victims within a limited class of individ-
uals. These classes were only generally defined by the court. Despite
references to the contrary, the Soper court failed to balance the proba-
tive qualities of the evidence against its inherent infirmities. The ques-
tion of whether the court felt such balancing is rendered unnecessary
by the expanded "lewd disposition" exception, or whether the court
merely ignored the substantive balancing requirements is therefore un-
clear. In either case, the Soper decision stands for the proposition that
evidence of prior sexual misdeeds, whether with the same or other
similarly situated individuals, is almost always relevant to showing a
lewd or lustful inclination toward members of that limited class, and
that the prejudicial effects of the evidence are not worth considering in
detail. The effect of the court's holding is to allow the introduction of
character evidence to show propensity in sexual assault cases. Thus,
in this particular area of the law, the courts have developed a double
standard in applying Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b).
There are several solutions to the problems presented by the So-
per case. The first solution would be to accept the Soper extension of
the Burke exception, but to apply consistently in all future cases a
thorough balancing under Rule 403. Although more evidence be-
comes eligible for admission under the expanded exception, a rigorous
191. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5239, at 438 n.52 (proof of
the other crime need not meet the reasonable doubt standard).
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examination of the accompanying prejudice and confusion theoreti-
cally would exclude the most egregious evidence.
An intermediate but more difficult solution would be to eliminate
the Soper extension to the Burke exception, while also applying a more
comprehensive balancing process. The extension is the apparent prod-
uct of a results-oriented decision, based on the unsettling facts of the
Soper case. Nonetheless, the decision in Soper is untenable in light of
the Bolden 192 case. In Bolden, the prosecution had introduced evi-
dence that the defendant had sexually abused his two daughters and
their friends in a wide variety of ways, for a period of three years, by
coercing them through bribery and intoxication. 193 With the sole ex-
ception of the duration of abuse, the circumstances in Bolden tend to
disturb one's sense of propriety much more than those in Soper. Yet,
the court reached the opposite result in Bolden. 194 Besides duration,
the only significant fact distinguishing Bolden from Soper is that the
prior acts in the former case allegedly involved not only the defend-
ant's own daughters, but additionally young girls unrelated to him.
Perhaps in retrospect, Bolden establishes a fixed boundary to the lim-
ited class roughly defined in Soper. The Alaska Supreme Court de-
clined to review the Soper decision by a narrowly split vote. 195 It
remains possible, therefore, that soon a case similar to Soper may
come before the supreme court with different results.
A final solution would be to repeal the Burke exception in its en-
tirety, and require the state to specify alternative uses, such as those
listed in Rule 404(b), for any character evidence of prior sexual abuse
sought to be introduced. This last possibility, while requiring a re-
trenchment from the Burke position, is the one option most compati-
ble with the history and intent of Rule 404(b). Of course, meaningful
balancing should also be applied as a component of this last
alternative.
Two leading commentators have written that "there is no ques-
tion of evidence more frequently litigated in the appellate courts than
the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts."1 96 The
frequent appearance of these cases in the Alaska court system alone
confirms these characterizations. Indeed, it is more probable than not
that the admissibility of prior bad acts will continue to taunt and chal-
lenge the judiciary and bar in Alaska for years to come. The present
192. Bolden v. State, 720 P.2d 957 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). See supra text accom-
panying notes 105-09.
193. Bolden, 720 P.2d at 958-59.
194. Id. at 960.
195. Soper v. State, No. S-2019, slip op. at 1 (Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
196. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5239, at 427.
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trend is toward liberalization of the exclusionary rule in order to facili-
tate the prosecution of sex offenders. The courts should strongly con-
sider the natural implication of such a development, which surely
would be the complete emasculation of Rule 404(b), certainly in the
context of sexual offenses, and possibly in other contexts as well. Pru-
dence commands that the courts should attempt to apply existing evi-
dentiary rules more uniformly, despite the special difficulties that often
arise in sexual abuse cases.
Brian E Lam
Author's Postscript
While this note was at the printer, the Alaska House of Repre-
sentatives voted on and unanimously passed House Bill No. 237,197
which, if enacted into law, would modify several provisions of the
Alaska Criminal Code and certain procedural and evidentiary rules of
the Alaska courts.198 These changes are apparently designed to facili-
tate the prosecution of cases involving "physical and sexual offenses
against children." 199 Of particular relevance to this note, sections nine
and ten of this bill are intended to amend Alaska Rule of Evidence
404(b). The proposed change to Rule 404(b) implicitly affirms the de-
cision of the Alaska Court of Appeals in Soper v. State,2°° and ex-
pressly reverses that court's decision in Bolden v. State.201 Thus, at
least one chamber of the Alaska Legislature has adopted an approach
opposite to the one suggested by this note, and has further diluted the
sound evidentiary protections of Rule 404(b).
Section 9 of House Bill No. 237 consolidates the current text of
Rule 404(b) into a single subsection, subsection (1), and adds a com-
pletely new subsection, subsection (2).202 If successfully amended,
Rule 404(b) would read as follows:
197. H.R. 237, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1988).
198. House Bill No. 237 amends or adds ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.110(a)(2) (defini-
tion of second degree murder), 11.41.200(a)(3) (definition of first degree assault),
11.41.434(a)(3) (definition of first degree sexual abuse of a minor), 11.42.436(a)(5)
(definition of second degree sexual abuse of a minor), 12.55.025(e) (consecutive sen-
tencing for multiple convictions), 12.55.025(h) (consecutive sentencing for multiple
convictions for abuse or assault of a minor) 12.55.155(c)(18)(B) (assault or abuse of a
minor as an aggravating factor to be considered under presumptive sentencing),
ALASKA R. GRIM. P. 8(a) (joinder of offenses), and ALASKA R. EvID. 404(b) (prior
bad acts). H.R. 237, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1988).
199. Id.
200. 731 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), petition for hearing denied, No. S-2019
(Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
201. 720 P.2d 957 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
202. H.R. 237, 15th Leg., 2nd Sess. § 9 (Alaska 1988).
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(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(2) In a prosecution for a crime involving a physical or sexual as-
sault or abuse of a minor, evidence of other acts by the defendant
toward the same or another child is admissible to show a common
scheme or plan if admission of the evidence is not precluded by an-
other rule of evidence and if the prior offenses (i) are not too remote
in time; (ii) are similar to the offense charged; and (iii) were com-
mitted upon persons similar to the prosecuting witness.203
The first two factors contained in the proposed subsection (2), remote-
ness and resemblance, reflect the balancing considerations originally
applied by the Alaska Supreme Court in Oksoktaruk v. State.204 The
third factor, similarity of the victims, was rejected by the Alaska
Court of Appeals in Bolden v. State, 205 Moor v. State, 20 6 and Pletnikoff
v. State,207 but was eventually applied in Soper v. State.208
The reason for the proposed change to Rule 404(b) is provided in
the Draft Letter of Intent prepared by the Alaska House Judiciary
Committee:
[H]aving heard testimony about patterns of behavior of many of
these [child sex] offenders, the Legislature finds that the judiciary
has drawn the line too narrowly in excluding evidence of prior mis-
conduct, particularly as to non-family members, and that it is ap-
propriate to re-draw the line. The Legislature therefore specifically
intends to reverse the decision in Bolden v. State.20 9
The Draft Letter of Intent also quotes language from the Soper opin-
ion in support of the proposed modification of Rule 404(b).2 10
Although the proposed change to Rule 404(b) does not expressly
203. Id.
204. 611 P.2d 521, 525 (Alaska 1980); see also supra notes 66-68 and accompany-
ing text.
205. 720 P.2d 957, 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); see also supra notes 124-28 and
accompanying text.
206. 709 P.2d 498, 506 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); see also supra notes 113-21 and
accompanying text.
207. 719 P.2d 1039, 1044 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); see also supra notes 129-35 and
accompanying text.
208. 731 P.2d 587, 590 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), petition for hearing denied, No. S-
2019 (Alaska Apr. 2, 1987).
209. House Judiciary Comm., Draft Letter of Intent Accompanying H.R. 237,
15th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1988).
210. Id. (quoting Soper, 731 P.2d at 590-91 (" 'A sexually abusing parent has tre-
mendous control over his dependent children. He can pick his time and place to mini-
mize the risk of discovery.'" Thus, evidence of prior bad acts "'may tend to make
the alleged incident appear much more plausible and probable' "thereby offsetting the
"'swearing contest between the parent denying unlawful conduct and the child alleg-
ing it' ")).
19881
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
adopt the "lewd disposition" exception, it is apparent from both the
language of the new subsection and the Draft Letter of Intent that
House Bill No. 237 incorporates the rationale of the Soper court that
underlies the expanded "lewd disposition" exception.
The proposed Rule 404(b)(2) is substantially broader than the So-
per court's interpretation of Rule 404(b) as it is currently constituted.
First, the "limited class" of individuals referenced in Soper could in-
clude, under the proposed modification, any child, not merely the sib-
lings of the named victim.2 11 Second, the prior offenses need only be
"similar to the offense charged" and "committed upon persons similar
to the prosecuting witness" rather than "substantially similar" as the
court of appeals required in Soper.212 Third, Rule 404(b)(2) would
apply "not only to cases involving sexual assault, sexual abuse and
physical abuse against a child, but also to homicides where the victim
is a child and to cases involving unlawful exploitation of children. 213
Finally, the modified rule "is not intended to be limited to statutory
offenses nor require a strict analysis of statutory elements. '2 14
Section ten of House Bill No. 237 makes all changes to Rule
404(b) retroactive.2 15 Rule 404(b)(2) would therefore apply to evi-
dence of acts committed before the effective date of the changes, and in
trials involving offenses committed before that date.2 16
If House Bill No. 237 is subsequently adopted by the Alaska Sen-
ate and signed into law, state prosecutors could introduce a broad va-
riety of propensity evidence in cases involving the sexual or physical
abuse and assault of minor children. In this one area of the law, there-
fore, the rule prohibiting the circumstantial use of character evidence
would be rendered a nullity.
211. H.R. 237, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. § 9 (Alaska 1988); see also Soper, 731 P.2d at
590.
212. Id.
213. House Judiciary Comm., Draft Letter of Intent Accompanying H.R. 237,
15th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1988).
214. Id.
215. H.R. 237, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. § 10 (Alaska 1988).
216. Id.
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